"Irán y las Petromonarquías del Golfo Pérsico: Nuevo Escenario"

Como es costumbre, de nuevo otro curioso artículo de The Economist sobre cómo la economía tiene mucho más poder de lo que algunos imaginan.

RELATIONS between Iran's Shia revolutionaries and the rich, Sunni-dominated, American-protected Arabian monarchies of the Persian Gulf have never been easy. After America's invasion of Iraq in 2003, and Iran's election of the fire-breathing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president in 2005, they grew markedly worse. Arab fears of Iran's regional ambitions, its influence over Shia minorities and its nuclear programme have lately been matched by Iranian worries about the loyalty of its own Arabs and the possibility of an attack launched from the American bases that speckle the opposite shore.

But recent events signal a possible change. On the same day on which a new American National Intelligence Estimate overturned previous assertions that Iran is actively pursuing nuclear weapons, President Ahmadinejad made a first-ever appearance as a guest at the annual summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a body created in 1981 largely with the goal of containing revolutionary Iran.

Soon after the summit meeting, Saudi Arabia, the biggest by far of the GCC's six member states and long the most hostile to Iran, invited Mr Ahmadinejad to take part in the annual haj pilgrimage to Mecca. Another Arab heavyweight, Egypt, has also joined the charm offensive, sending its first high-level delegation to Iran in several years.

Cross-Gulf suspicions, however, have not suddenly evaporated. Like many Western governments, the Gulf monarchies remain concerned that Iran's nuclear programme is oddly shaped for civilian-only purposes (see article). Arab leaders continue to charge Iran with a host of misdemeanours, ranging from alleged meddling in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine to occupying a trio of mid-Gulf islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Mr Ahmadinejad's proposal, at the summit, to pursue a regional security pact “without foreign influence” was viewed sceptically, as merely a way for Iran to replace America as the Gulf's guardian.

Still, there is relief over the lessening of tensions. However much they dislike Iran's mullahs, Gulf Arabs dislike more the idea of getting caught up in a war between Iran and America. In recent months they have not been especially happy with their erstwhile American ally, despite the Bush administration's belated effort to address Arab concerns over Palestine and to disentangle itself from Iraq. Earlier this year, for instance, the parliament of Bahrain, an island state that hosts America's Fifth Fleet, passed a non-binding motion banning the use of its territory for any attack on Iran.

Economic considerations are also playing their part. Cross-Gulf trade is growing fast. Bahrain itself recently signed a deal to import Iranian natural gas. And this link pales by comparison with the flourishing trade between Iran and Dubai, the most mercantile of the seven emirates that make up the UAE.

Partly because of sanctions, and partly because of the restrictive business environment in Iran, tiny Dubai has become a vital lifeline for its vast neighbour. As many as 400,000 Iranian expatriates now live in the UAE, with nearly 9,000 part-Iranian-owned firms registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Iran is the main destination for exports from Dubai, with much of the volume hauled by the scores of picturesque dhows that line the city-state's Creek.

The Iranian leadership likes to paint this relationship as one that benefits Gulf Arabs more than itself. But with its own inefficient economy foundering, and with the GCC countries jointly wielding hundreds of billions of dollars in investment capital, it is the Arabs who now carry greater clout.